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How does the law of judicial precedent work in practice? That is
the question at the heart of The Law of Judicial Precedent, the first
treatise on the subject in more than ioo years. The treatise sets aside
more theoretical and familiar questions about whether and why earlier
decisions (especially wrong ones) should bind courts in new cases.' In-
stead, it offers an exhaustive how-to guide for practicing lawyers and
judges: how to identify relevant precedents, how to weigh them, and
how to interpret them. In short, how to apply precedents to new cases.
The treatise's thirteen authors include representatives from several
of the federal circuit courts, justices from two state supreme courts, and
the U.S. Supreme Court's newest member, Justice Neil Gorsuch.2 Their
coauthor and the project's fountainhead, Bryan Garner, is the editor of
Black's Law Dictionary and one of the country's leading authorities on
legal writing and reasoning.3 The treatise is not a compendium of chap-
ters written separately by these authors and loosely tied to a common
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** Associate Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law; Law Clerk to the Honorable
Paul J. Watford, 2012-2013.
*** Law Clerk to the Honorable Paul J. Watford, 20I0-2017. In many chambers, judges work
closely with their law clerks to resolve cases and draft opinions. In preparing this Review, we drew
on our experiences working together in chambers and took a similarly collaborative approach to
this project. (Admittedly, three authors for a book review may be excessive, but it seems only fair
given our task of reviewing a work by thirteen authors.) For helpful comments and suggestions,
we are grateful to Michael Evans, Michael Klarman, Randy Kozel, Eric Nguyen, John Rappaport,
Alice Wang, and Esther Yoo, as well as to participants in a faculty workshop at the University of
Maine School of Law.
1 See infra section I.A, pp. 545-49.
2 The judicial authors are Carlos Bea of the Ninth Circuit, Rebecca White Berch of the
Supreme Court of Arizona, Neil M. Gorsuch of the U.S. Supreme Court, Harris L Hartz of the
Tenth Circuit, Nathan L. Hecht of the Supreme Court of Texas, Brett M. Kavanaugh of the D.C.
Circuit, Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit, Sandra L. Lynch of the First Circuit, William H. Pryor
Jr. of the Eleventh Circuit, Thomas M. Reavley of the Fifth Circuit, Jeffrey S. Sutton of the Sixth
Circuit, and Diane P Wood of the Seventh Circuit.
3 In addition to various style and usage manuals, he coauthored two books with Justice Antonin
Scalia. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART OF PER-
SUADING JUDGES (2008); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE IN-
TERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (20I2) [hereinafter SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW].
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theme. Rather, the authors worked together on the entire treatise to
speak with one voice in an effort to bring unprecedented cohesion to the
law of judicial precedent.
That undertaking involved assembling the principles that govern the
application of federal, state, international, and foreign precedents in
American courts. Because no one has done that since 1912 (p. Xiii), 4 the
project required research across a vast number of cases and authorities
that had not previously been brought together. The result is a distilla-
tion of ninety-three "blackletter" principles of judicial precedent (pp. xv-
xxvi). For example, the first principle: "Like cases should be decided
alike."
This Review takes up the treatise on its own terms as a practice guide
for working lawyers and judges (p. 18). Our initial aim is to identify
how the treatise can be useful to lawyers and judges by describing its
scope and drawing out some of its more salient lessons. Accordingly, in
Part I, we provide a roadmap of the types of problems that the treatise
addresses and the principles that it identifies for resolving them. Fol-
lowing the treatise's lead, our discussion explores what types of prece-
dents bind which courts and how much weight they should be given.
To evaluate the treatise's contribution on that score, we first situate the
treatise in the context of the existing literature on precedent and identify
some possible limitations inherent in the treatise's project. In particular,
it is fair to wonder whether and to what extent our system of precedent,
consisting largely of modes of reasoning, can be codified into blackletter
rules.
In Part II, we home in on the distinct challenge of interpreting pre-
cedent, for which the guiding principles are least susceptible to articu-
lation as blackletter rules. Although the treatise focuses on the reader's
task of interpreting an earlier decision, it also reveals how interpretation
is really a "dialogue between courts" (p. 73). That is, a future court
ultimately decides what an earlier decision means, but the authoring
court can facilitate that task by clarifying its decision's reasoning and
scope.
We see this central insight as an opening to flip the treatise's per-
spective and ask how the treatise's insights on the interpretation of pre-
cedent can inform the writing of opinions that become precedents.
Knowing the challenges future readers will face in reading and applying
a case as precedent, what can the judges do at the front end of the pro-
cess to craft more effective precedent?5 Part II is organized according
4 See HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS
OR THE SCIENCE OF CASE LAW (1912).
5 Professor Jeremy Waldron engages in a similar inquiry, though his is more philosophical in
nature. His article explores the respective roles of authoring and interpreting courts in using stare
decisis to promote the rule of law. See Jeremy Waldron, Stare Decisis and the Rule of Law: A
Layered Approach, iII MICH. L. REV. I, 2 (2012).
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to three key steps in the opinion-writing process: refining the question
presented, identifying the governing law, and describing the material
facts. At each step, we translate the guidance that the treatise provides
for the interpretation process into lessons for authoring courts to con-
sider at the drafting stage.
We hope the lessons on writing precedent will be useful not only to
judges and their law clerks but also to advocates. After all, identifying
what judges can do to write more effective precedent also sheds light on
how advocates can be more helpful in the way they frame the case for
the court.
I. PRECEDENT IN PRACTICE
A. From "Why" to "How": A Science of Caselaw?
Perhaps the best way to introduce The Law of Judicial Precedent is
to point out what it is not: a study of whether precedent should bind
judicial decisionmaking and the reasons why or why not. That is telling
because much scholarship on precedent has traditionally been interested
in the question of why earlier decisions bind judges' subsequent deci-
sions (and whether they should at all). To appreciate the treatise's con-
tribution, that question merits some preliminary attention.
Why do American courts defer to precedent? One answer empha-
sizes fairness. The idea is that similar cases ought to come out the same
way; outcomes shouldn't arbitrarily turn on who the decisionmaker is.
Scholars also invoke a set of practical reasons justifying the doctrine of
binding precedent (pp. 9-12). For example, the doctrine ensures that
judicial outcomes are more predictable so that people can figure out
what the law is and plan their lives accordingly. Following precedent
also helps conserve judicial resources given that it relieves courts from
having to decide the legal questions in every case anew.6
But those benefits come at a cost. Being bound by earlier decisions
means occasionally being bound by wrong decisions, too. The treatise's
recurring example of that risk is the Supreme Court's 1922 decision
holding that major league baseball does not involve "interstate com-
merce" and is therefore beyond the scope of federal antitrust legislation
6 On the practical justifications for precedent, see Earl Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C.
L. REV. 367, 368-72 (1988); and Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 597-602
(1987). Not all defenses of precedent, of course, rest on practical grounds. See, e.g., Anthony T.
Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. I029, Io66 (1990) (defending adherence to pre-




(pp. 4, loo, 335-36).1 As controversial as that precedent strikes the trea-
tise's authors, it nevertheless continues to bind the courts almost a cen-
tury after it was decided.
More recent scholarly attention to precedent concerns less the prac-
tical reasons for and against he doctrine of binding precedent and more
the source and scope of its lejal basis. Despite the central role precedent
plays in our legal system, the Constitution nowhere mentions it. Is the
binding nature of precedent a constitutional mandate, enshrined as part
of the "judicial Power" in Article III, or a mere "judicial policy" that
Congress might even be able to override by statute (pp. 6-7)?8 With
respect to constitutional decisions, scholarly disagreement over how
strong the binding nature of precedent should be often reflects broader
differences in approaches to constitutional interpretation.9 For example,
scholars who privilege the constitutional text and original understanding
of that text might be more skeptical of precedent when an earlier deci-
sion conflicts with the best reading of the text and its original meaning.10
By contrast, proponents of the view that the Constitution takes on
meaning only through the process of interpreting the text over time tend
to embrace stronger theories of precedent."
The Law of Judicial Precedent arrives against this scholarly
backdrop with an altogether different mission. It seeks to provide "a
conventional description of contemporary practice useful to the working
lawyer and judge" (p. 18). For judges like the ones who coauthored the
treatise and for the lawyers who appear before them, it is axiomatic that
precedent binds their work. The question then is how does precedent
7 Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat'1 League of Prof'1 Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
8 The treatise compares THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 463 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 2003), with Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997). For a defense of the constitu-
tional stature of stare decisis and a discussion of the issue's implications, see generally Richard.H.
Fallon, Jr., Essay, Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional Methodology, 76
N.Y.U. L. REV. 570 (2001).
9 See Kurt T. Lash, Essay, Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare Decisis, 93 VA.
L. REV. 1437, 1439 (2007); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of Pre-
cedent, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 289, 291 (2005).
10 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical as
It Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 258-59 (2005); Steven G. Calabresi, Text, Precedent, and
the Constitution: Some Originalist and Normative Arguments for Overruling Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 31l, 312-13 (2005); Gary Lawson,
The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARv.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 23, 27-28 (1994); Michael
Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the Precedential Effect
of Roe and Casey?, log YALE L.J. 1535, 1538 (2oo). But see John 0. McGinnis & Michael B.
Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism and Precedent, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 803, 803-04 (2009);
Thomas W. Merrill, Originalism, Stare Decisis and the Promotion of Judicial Restraint, 22 CONST
COMMENT. 271, 272-74 (2005); Jonathan F. Mitchell, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Text, ino
MICH. L. REV. I, 2-3 (2011).
11 See Geoffrey R. Stone, Precedent, the Amendment Process, and Evolution in Constitutional
Doctrine, ii HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 67, 70-73 (1988); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitu-
tional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 879, 926-27 (1996).
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operate in practice? Surprisingly, very little scholarship before this
treatise has probed that question systematically, and none in such
granular detail, despite its enormous practical importance.12
The authors describe The Law of Judicial Precedent as a "hornbook"
containing ninety-three "blackletter" principles that govern when and to
what extent an earlier decision is precedential (p. xiii). The volume seeks
to revive a tradition from the turn of the twentieth century of hornbooks
that treated precedent as a topic capable of systematic study (p. xiii) -
as a "science of caselaw" in the words of one of those hornbooks.13 Thus,
to the extent that The Law of Judicial Precedent can be said to have a
thesis, it is that the law of judicial precedent can be coherently organized
according to governing principles.
The project to codify the law of judicial precedent might initially
provoke some skepticism. To begin with, principles of precedent often
seem more like modes of reasoning rather than firm rules. Modes of
reasoning generally require an exercise of discretion to determine the
appropriate course of action, whereas that is less often true with firm
rules.14 For example, Principle #7 tells us that "[f]or one decision to be
precedent for another, the facts in the two cases need not be identical.
But they must be substantially similar, without material difference"
(p. 92). That principle is undoubtedly correct. But, as the authors
acknowledge, the principle cannot be applied mechanically like a rule.
Rather, the principle merely invites a particular mode of analogical rea-
soning, which involves identifying the relevant points of comparison and
12 There are limited exceptions. See RICHARD B. CAPPALLI, THE AMERICAN COMMON LAW
METHOD (1997) (offering "an account of how American judges ... create, interpret and apply
precedents," id. at 3); RANDY J. KOZEL, SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT. A THEORY OF PRECEDENT
(2017) (discussing, among other things, the interpretive problem of identifying a precedent's cope
and the challenge of weighing a precedent's strength); INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS (D. Neil
MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1997) (comparing how precedent works among various
countries). There is a more substantial literature on the specific problem of distinguishing holdings
from dicta. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV.
953 (2005). Of course, scholars engage in extensive discussions about the interpretation of precedent
in particular domains; it's the more systematic analyses of the practice of precedent in general that
are less common than one might expect.
13 BLACK, supra note 4, at vi; see also EUGENE WAMBAUGH, THE STUDY OF CASES (3d ed.
1909). The Law of Judicial Precedent is particularly indebted to Henry Campbell Black's Hand-
book on the Law ofJudicial Precedents. The newer treatise adopts the basic structure and scope of
the older treatise. It's unclear why earlier efforts to treat the law of judicial precedent systematically
were not picked up again until now. The rise of legal realism and increased skepticism of legal
formalism in the first half of the twentieth century may have undermined the perceived coherence
of Black's project, for the reasons we discuss below. Cf generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960 (1992).
14 In this way, we are referring to "rules" in the sense of firm rules of decision, as opposed to
discretion-conferring standards. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule ofLaw as a Law ofRules, 56 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1175, 1177-78 (1989).
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the relevant level of generality for the comparison.'5 In this way, from
the perspective of guiding courts toward a course of action, there are
limits to the utility of offering principles of precedent as blackletter rules.
More broadly, the very effort to codify blackletter rules of precedent
might imply an unrealistic view of judging in which answers about how
to interpret and apply precedent can be looked up and rotely applied to
the case at hand. In this regard, Judge Richard Posner forcefully cri-
tiqued another effort by Bryan Garner and coauthor Justice Antonin
Scalia - in their handbook Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal
Texts - to systematize the law in an area that similarly resists codifica-
tion.16 Judge Posner is a leading proponent of the view that judges do
not and cannot decide cases through the mechanical application of rules,
that the exercise of discretion is inevitable, and that the legal system
would be better served if judges engaged in such reasoning more
openly." He therefore took exception to Reading Law for what he con-
sidered to be its unrealistic "passive view of the judicial role" and its
deceptive claims that textual originalism provides an "'objective' inter-
pretive methodology."18 Analogously, if the interpretation and applica-
tion of precedent is a messier process requiring discretion, then a judge's
purported reliance on blackletter rules to determine the scope and
weight of a given precedent might mask the full set of judgments actu-
ally entailed in that process.
We think any initial skepticism about the treatise's project to sys-
tematize the law of precedent will prove largely unfounded. On its own
terms, the treatise is frankly uninterested in settling the longstanding
debate between legal realists and formalists over the extent to which
precedent constrains judging. The former emphasize the exercise of dis-
cretion involved in applying precedent, characterizing it as a "work-
bench of tools" for achieving particular results, while the latter view
precedents as much more rule-like, in the sense that they can be applied
mechanically.19
The authors do (rightly) reject the extreme realist view that judicial
reliance on precedent merely reflects policy preferences - a position
1s See Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, On Analogical Reasoning, io6 HARV. L. REV. 741, 743-
49 (1993).
16 See SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 3; Richard A. Posner, The Incoherence
of Antonin Scalia, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 24, 2012), https://newrepublic.com/article/io6441/scalia-
garner-readingthelaw-textual-originalism [https://perma.cc/C6JT-TQgT].
17 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 9-13 (2oo8); Richard A. Posner, Prag-
matic Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 4-8 (1996).
18 Posner, supra note 16.
19 KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 91 (ig6o).
Compare, e.g., id., and BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS




they describe as the "cynical" view of judging (pp. 74-75). But they
never go so far to the other extreme as to suggest hat most past decisions
can be translated into rules and applied mechanically. Instead, their
project merely treats many of the principles governing the use of prece-
dent as rules. And even then, the treatise is transparent about the prin-
ciples that cannot be readily reduced to firm rules and for which it can
offer only general guidance and illustrations. In this way, the authors'
description of the principles as "blackletter" means simply that they are
"well settled,"20 without the connotation of a firm legal rule that the
term sometimes has.
The authors thus envision judges as engaged in a collective project
to develop and elucidate the law in which principles for interpreting and
applying precedent do in fact constrain their work, even if discretion
must sometimes be exercised to implement those principles. "[M]ost
judges who serve in our system of justice," the treatise attests, "sincerely
believe that they are following rules that constrain them - and earnestly
seek to follow these rules" (p. 75). Our own discussion of writing pre-
cedent in Part II is undertaken in the same spirit. After all, if we did
not think that later courts would attempt to construe precedent faith-
fully, there would be little reason for us to encourage authoring courts
to work to clarify the scope and reasoning of their decisions - that is,
to treat writing precedent as a craft.
B. The Problems and Principles of Precedent
The main contribution of The Law of Judicial Precedent is identify-
ing and assembling in one volume the various problems and questions
of precedent hat practicing lawyers and judges might encounter, as well
as guiding principles for resolving them. The principles themselves are
not novel. (Nor, with some exceptions, are they so well established as
to be irrefutable.) But that is not what we ask of law treatises, which
generally seek instead to organize and clarify an area of law for the sake
of reference. In that vein, The Law of Judicial Precedent provides a
framework for organizing the principles of precedent while also but-
tressing their salience.
The authors distill what they aptly call the "dizzying matrix of doc-
trines and subdoctrines" governing precedent to ninety-three principles,
each of which is discussed in detail (p. 781). The principles are divided
into nine sections: "The Nature and Authority of Judicial Precedents,"
"Weight of Decisions," "Some Practicalities of Stare Decisis," "The Law
of the Case," "Federal Doctrine and Practice," "State Law in Federal
Court," "State-Law Doctrine and Practice," "Foreign Precedents," and
"Arbitrations." For quick reference, the treatise includes an annotated
20 Blackletter Law, BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (loth ed. 2014).
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table of contents that lists all of the principles (pp. xv-xxvi) and a glos-
sary of key terms (pp. 785-809).
The treatise defines "precedent" in two ways:
i. Something of the same type that has occurred or existed before. 2. An
action or official decision that can be used as support for later actions or
decisions; esp., a decided case that furnishes a basis for determining later
cases involving similar facts or issues. (p. 8oi)
The treatise primarily has in mind the latter clause of the second defi-
nition, and it thus mostly discusses earlier judicial decisions (see pp. 2 2,
24). But in keeping with the broader definition of precedent, the treatise
also occasionally considers nonjudicial decisions by executive actors, leg-
islative bodies, and arbitrators. Whatever the type of precedent consid-
ered, the treatise does so almost exclusively from the perspective of fed-
eral and state courts in the United States.
The Law of Judicial Precedent can be consulted much like a treatise
on, say, the rules of evidence or federal jurisdiction. In many instances,
readers will find a relatively clear answer to whatever question is at
hand. For example, suppose you're working on a legal issue for which
there are two controlling yet irreconcilable earlier decisions of equal au-
thority. Which do you follow? Principle #36 provides an answer. If
your case is in a lower court and the jurisdiction's high court issued the
two earlier decisions, the treatise tells us, the more recent decision gen-
erally controls. However, if the case is before an intermediate appellate
court and the two earlier decisions are that court's own precedent, then
the earlier case generally controls.2 1 Where answers to questions can be
guided only by fuzzier general principles - such as the factors that bear
on whether a higher court should overrule its own precedent (Principles
#47 and #48) - the treatise illustrates the principle through examples
and collects competing approaches by different courts. The treatise is
also a resource for identifying unresolved issues - for example, whether
federal district court decisions are binding on bankruptcy courts (pp.
515-16).
Below, we offer a roadmap of the themes and questions for which
lawyers and judges might consult the treatise. Our discussion incorpo-
rates the treatise's own topical section divisions, but it primarily tracks
the central problems at the core of the treatise that lawyers and judges
encounter while working with precedent. In a given case, lawyers and
judges must first identify the possible universe of decisions issued by the
court or other courts that might have precedential value in the case.
21 In such circumstances, lower courts generally assume that the high court overruled itself, if
not explicitly then tacitly. Intermediate appellate courts, by contrast, follow the "'general rule' that
'one panel may not overrule the decision of a prior panel"' and therefore resolve conflicts in favor
of earlier decisions (pp. 303-04) (quoting Billiot v. Puckett, 135 F.3d 311, 316 (5th Cir. 1998)). There
are exceptions to the rules in both scenarios (pp. 301-05).
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Then they must determine the weight that the court should afford to
each precedent. Taken together, the scope of the treatise's central in-
quiry is therefore "what precedents have binding power, and how far
they have it" (p. 19).22
i. "What Precedents Have Binding Power" - The threshold prob-
lem encountered in working with precedent is identifying the universe
of earlier decisions that are binding on the court. The answer depends
on the identity of the interpreting court and the source of the earlier
decision. Roughly the second half of the treatise explores this issue,
including the sections on the law of the case, federalism, foreign prece-
dents, and arbitration.
At the most intimate scale of a court considering its own earlier de-
cisions within the same litigation, the law of the case doctrine dictates
when those earlier decisions govern later stages of the dispute (Principle
#52). The treatise sets out the basic parameters of the doctrine -
namely, that the earlier decision governs only if it was a final decision
that was necessary to resolve the dispute (Principles #53 and #54). The
treatise also identifies the circumstances in which an earlier decision
may nevertheless be reconsidered, such as when a material fact or con-
trolling legal authority changes (Principle #59). The treatise pays special
attention to complications introduced by appeals. Under the mandate
rule, any decision made on appeal binds the lower court on remand
(Principle #55), and the scope of subsequent appeals is limited to ques-
tions not determined or waived in the earlier appeal (Principle #56).
Doctrinal wrinkles for which the treatise might be consulted include
whether a jurisdictional issue decided in an earlier appeal is the law of
the case in a subsequent appeal (yes) and whether the law of a case
dismissed without prejudice governs a subsequent action based on a
substantially similar complaint (unclear) (pp. 469-71).
At the broader scale of our federal system, principles of federalism
govern when federal and state courts are bound by earlier federal and
state decisions.
The federal courts follow only federal precedents on questions of fed-
eral law, international law, and maritime law, as well as issues related
to the scope of their jurisdiction (Principles #64, #65, #67, and #69). That
said, they occasionally borrow state rules to supplement federal common
law and maritime law (Principles #66 and #69). District courts are
bound by decisions of federal law by the courts of appeals in their re-
spective circuits (Principle #6o), and neither district courts nor courts of
appeals are bound by other courts of equal rank (Principle #62).23
22 The treatise quotes FRANcIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS 192
(William G. Hammond ed., 3d ed. i88o).
23 An exception is that a newly formed court of appeals may bind itself to the decisions of the
court that previously exercised its jurisdiction. For example, the Eleventh Circuit binds itself to the
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Federal courts otherwise follow state precedents on substantive state
law in both diversity and federal question cases (Principles #70 and #75).
In practice, that means that a federal court adjudicating a state law issue
follows the decisions of the state's highest court. In the absence of a
controlling decision, the federal court predicts how the high court would
rule on the issue as if the federal court were a lower state court (Principle
#73). The treatise also provides guidance on determining which state's
law governs in diversity cases (Principle #72), as well as on the process
for certifying questions to a state high court (Principle #74).
In turn, state courts follow their own high courts on state law ques-
tions and the U.S. Supreme Court on federal questions and when state
law is preempted by federal law (Principles #77, #79, and #81). When a
state court must resolve a question governed by the law of another state,
the other state's precedents are binding (Principle #84). But if a state
borrows a statute from another state, the other state's precedents inter-
preting that statute are merely persuasive authority (Principle #85).
Principles of uniformity and comity also guide interstate judicial rela-
tions. A state high court facing a novel question of state law should
generally aim for uniformity with the other states if there is a trend
toward unanimity on the point, although the court is not bound to do so
(Principle #83). And even though a state court decides for itself whether
another state's law is penal in nature, and hence unenforceable in other
states, it might nevertheless enforce the law as a matter of comity (Prin-
ciple #87).24
At the global scale beyond our federal system, a lawyer or judge may
need to determine what weight to give to earlier decisions by foreign
and international tribunals. The treatise indicates that a foreign deci-
sion is not precedential in American courts unless the parties' rights turn
on a question of foreign law and the foreign country's own courts treat
the decision as precedential (Principle #90). As for international law,
earlier decisions by international tribunals are not binding on American
courts or even on the tribunals themselves (Principle #91). (In practice,
decisions of the Fifth Circuit predating its split from that circuit, whereas the Tenth Circuit does
not do so with respect to the Eighth Circuit's decisions predating their own split (pp. 513-14).
24 In the more granular detail of the treatise, readers will find all sorts of diversity in how states
deal with judicial precedent. For example, lawyers might not often think to consider the preceden-
tial stature of the syllabus summarizing a decision at the beginning of a reported decision. But it
turns out that syllabi for decisions by the state's highest court are considered binding precedent in
Kansas, Ohio, West Virginia, and Minnesota (pp. 151-52). In fact, only legal points included in the
syllabus are binding in Ohio (p. 152). Or consider the Texas Supreme Court's distinction between
"refusing" to review a lower court's decision and "denying" review. Denying review indicates noth-
ing about the merits of the lower court's decision, as is generally true when a higher court declines
to review a case. But "refusing" review gives the lower court's decision the same precedential value
as if the Texas Supreme Court had issued it (p. 263). In California, a decision of the intermediate
appellate court automatically has the precedential value of a decision by a court of last resort until
and unless the state's supreme court disavows it (and provided there is no conflict among the deci-
sions of the intermediate court) (p. 307).
[Vol. 311:543552
CRAFTING PRECEDENT
however, international tribunals tend to treat their past decisions as ef-
fectively controlling (pp. 763-65).)
Finally, the treatise briefly looks at arbitration, which occurs outside
the scope of judicial decisionmaking considered above. In arbitration,
earlier decisions by courts or other arbitrators have no formal preceden-
tial effect (Principles #92 and #93). The treatise's discussion of arbitra-
tion may prompt readers to compare the principles of contract that gov-
ern arbitration, in which the parties set the rules for what will bind the
arbitrator's decision, with the system of precedent described over the
several hundred preceding pages.
The treatise's observation that many fields of arbitration have none-
theless developed their own de facto practices of precedent (pp. 774-78),
as is true with international tribunals, raises the question whether pre-
cedent could ever really be abandoned in any iterative decisionmaking
process.25 In a sense, then, the discussion of arbitration provokes the
broader "why" question that the treatise sets aside as beyond its pur-
view: To what extent is a system of precedent desirable, and is it in fact
constitutive of judicial power?
2. "How Far They Have It." - Once a precedent is identified as
either binding or persuasive authority according to the principles dis-
cussed in the preceding section, a second challenge arises. At that point,
a lawyer or judge must determine the weight that the precedent should
be given in resolving the case at hand. Much of the first half of the
treatise, including the sections "Weight of Decisions" and "Some Practi-
calities of Stare Decisis," focuses on that challenge.
Of course, how far a precedent governs a given case depends in large
part on whether the precedent is binding. If a decision is not binding,
then a court will follow it only to the extent that the court finds the
decision persuasive (Principle #16). If a precedent is binding, however,
it usually but not always means just that (Principle #I5): "Lower courts
must strictly follow . . . decisions of higher courts in the same jurisdic-
tion" (p. 27). That rule also applies to a three-judge intermediate appel-
late panel with respect to that court's en banc decisions (p. 37). But
higher courts, including intermediate appellate courts sitting en banc,
are bound by their own decisions only in a less absolute sense (Principle
#3). That is, for the reasons discussed below, "stare decisis isn't a pro-
crustean bed" for higher courts (p. 156).
To begin with, a higher court's earlier decision might not be as prec-
edential as it initially seems. There could be some give in the joints. On
that score, Principle #15 offers some practical advice to lawyers and
judges who encounter a questionable precedent in a higher court. Study
the decision's underlying authorities; doing so may reveal, for example,
25 Similarly, foreign courts in civil law systems are not bound by precedent, but the treatise
observes that they have "moved toward common-law methods" over time (p. 17).
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that the court was in fact focused on a narrower issue and had not in-
tended to speak more broadly to the issue now at hand (p. 157). Scruti-
nize the extent of explanation offered; the absence of evidence that the
earlier court had fully considered the issue diminishes the decision's
precedential value (p. 158). Also assess whether the decision is a fledg-
ling or outlier decision that other courts haven't followed (pp. 159-60);
if so, the decision may occupy a "doctrinal no-man's land" where the
decision controls only in cases with identical facts, as is true with the
Supreme Court's major league baseball decision (p. ioo).
There is also the possibility that a higher court could overrule its
own earlier decision. The treatise's discussion of when to depart from
stare decisis turns on practical considerations, rather than grand theory.
The authors list several reasons to consider for and against overruling a
precedent (Principles #47 and #48). Those reasons seem to boil down,
the authors imply, to whether the decision has been acquiesced in and
relied upon by the public (pp. 396, 4o4).26 For example, decisions that
pertain to issues of procedure generally matter more prospectively and
thus affect reliance interests less than, say, decisions involving property
or contract rights (Principles #41 and #5 1). A court might therefore have
stronger ground to overrule a wrongly decided procedural decision than
a decision on a matter of property law. The authors also explain that
stare decisis has more force with respect to decisions involving statutory
interpretation, as opposed to constitutional decisions, because statutes
can be amended more readily than constitutions in response to judicial
decisions (Principles #38 and #40). The treatise also identifies factors
that should be irrelevant to this inquiry, including hardship in a partic-
ular case (Principle #49) and a change in the court's personnel (Principle
#5o), and factors with uncertain relevance, such as whether the age of
an older precedent is a ground for reconsidering it or preserving it (p.
357).
As a practical matter, no precedent will ever be overruled unless that
issue is before the appropriate higher court. That means the inquiry
into when a higher court might overrule one of its earlier decisions must
encompass the procedure by which that question gets before the court.
In the context of the federal courts, for example, the treatise explores
what makes an issue worthy of review by the Supreme Court (Principle
#63) or a court of appeals sitting en banc (Principle #61). Of course, the
Supreme Court is interested in resolving lower court splits, and the
courts of appeals are similarly attuned to policing intracircuit conflicts.
But there's also the more nebulous concept of whether a case presents a
sufficiently "important" issue to merit review. The treatise collects rele-
vant considerations on that front (pp. 498-505, 521-29).
26 The treatise cites Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis as Judicial Doctrine, 67 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 411, 414 (2010).
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That covers the bedrock differences in weight among nonbinding
precedents and those that are binding either in an absolute or looser
sense. In addition, the treatise furnishes an exhaustive catalog of
"weight" factors that bear on whether a court might follow a nonbinding
decision or depart from one of its own earlier decisions. In some in-
stances, these factors might also indicate that an apparently strictly
binding precedent is not in fact so.
Some of the factors correspond to the precedent's age and history. A
decision that other courts have repeatedly endorsed is entitled to more
weight, whether the decision was a "leading" one that first definitively
settled an important legal issue (Principle #17) or merely an "ancient"
one that has been consistently followed (Principle #18). Quite naturally,
judicial and scholarly approval of a decision generally increases a pre-
cedent's weight, whereas criticism lessens it (Principles #25 and #26). If
the decision is later overruled, it no longer has any weight, unless it
remains binding on federal collateral review of a criminal judgment or
because it would otherwise retroactively disturb vested rights (Principle
#37). The litigation history of the decision is relevant, too. The absence
of oral argument or full briefing may lessen a precedent's weight (Prin-
ciple #23), as is true if the decision resulted from ex parte, preliminary,
or interlocutory proceedings (Principle #24).
The rank and reputation of the court that issued the decision may
also matter. Where a court sits within its judicial hierarchy generally
corresponds with the precedential value of its decisions (Principles #27
and #29). And a court with a reputation for expertise in a particular
subject matter is more likely to speak authoritatively on that subject,
such as the Second Circuit on securities law or the D.C. Circuit on ad-
ministrative law (pp. 245-46). The treatise suggests that the individual
reputation of an authoring judge might similarly bear on the decision's
perceived persuasive value, at least with respect o judicial giants like
Benjamin Cardozo and Learned Hand (Principle #28).
Structural attributes of an opinion can affect a precedent's weight as
well. For example, advisory opinions by state high courts are merely
persuasive authority (Principle #32).2 Or consider a per curiam opinion
that is not signed by an authoring judge. Any lower court that is bound
by a higher court's decision will be equally bound by a per curiam opin-
ion. For other courts, the per curiam opinion's precedential value turns
on the extent of its reasoning: A summary opinion is less precedential,
whereas a reasoned opinion is treated the same as a signed opinion (Prin-
ciple #21).28
27 An exception to this general rule can be found in the constitutions of Colorado and South
Dakota, where advisory opinions by the states' high courts are binding on lower courts (p. 275).
28 This distinction is necessary, the treatise explains, in light of a change in the purposes of the
per curiam form over time (pp. 215-17). In earlier times, the form signaled that the result was
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Opinions differ not only in form but also in the level of support they
receive from the court's members, and this, too, should be taken into
consideration when assessing a decision's precedential value. The more
straightforward principles on this score are that unanimous opinions
generally carry more weight than split decisions (Principle #19), and that
equally divided decisions have no precedential value at all (Principle
#22). A trickier problem arises in the context of fragmented courts and
resulting plurality opinions. In the federal courts, under Marks v.
United States,29 the holding in a fractured decision is the "position taken
by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds."3 0 Generally speaking, that means the narrowest common
ground on which a majority of the concurring judges agreed, either ex-
plicitly or implicitly, is controlling in future cases (Principle #20). The
treatise identifies several complications that arise with this rule in prac-
tice. What if the concurrence offering the narrowest ground was not
necessary for the majority because a majority could be formed from
judges joining broader opinions (pp. 201-03)? Or what happens when
there is no common ground at all among concurring judges because they
adopt distinct reasoning such that no analysis could be described as the
"logical subset" of any other (p. 205)?31 If agreement on a point of law
can be found only among concurring and dissenting judges who merely
apply the legal principle to the facts differently, does that legal principle
control in future cases (pp. 206-07)? The treatise is a resource for track-
ing the disagreement in the federal courts on all of these questions.
One final point about the treatise's consideration of how far a pre-
cedent governs in a given case merits mentioning. As we noted above,
despite its title, the treatise occasionally considers nonjudicial prece-
dents. In that vein, the treatise's discussion of precedential weight en-
compasses the extent to which executive and legislative pronouncements
might influence judicial decisionmaking (Principles #33 and #34). There
is a brief discussion of attorney general opinions as persuasive authority
(pp. 277-85). The treatise also sets out the basic doctrine of
ChevronlSkidmore deference to agency interpretations of statutes, with-
out editorializing on the doctrine's merit (pp. 285-89). The treatise takes
a slightly more skeptical position on the value of legislative history in
obvious, in which case the opinion would be precedential regardless of whether the reasoning was
spelled out by the court. The form is still used to resolve easy cases, but it is now also used when
members of the court agree as to a result but not on the reasoning. It would thus be a mistake to
afford full precedential value to a per curiam opinion unless it's clear that at least a majority of the
court agreed on one line of reasoning for reaching that result.
29 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
30 Id. at 193 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (plurality opinion)).
31 The treatise quotes United States v. Epps, 707 F.3 d 337, 350 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
556 [Vol. 13r:543
CRAFTING PRECEDENT
statutory interpretation, for which it allows only "some weight" in
doubtful cases (p. 290).32
The treatise addresses one other major challenge of working with
precedent that we have not yet covered: interpreting precedent. Deter-
mining the meaning of an earlier decision combines both dimensions of
the treatise's inquiry into which precedents bind and how far. That is,
the extent to which an earlier decision is "on point" determines in large
part whether the decision is precedent for a particular case and, if so,
how much weight it should be afforded.
We turn to the principles governing interpretation in the next Part,
which expands our focus from the application of precedent to the front-
end process of writing precedent.
II. WRITING PRECEDENT
The Law of Judicial Precedent treats the interpretation of precedent
in its opening section, "The Nature and Authority of Judicial Prece-
dents." The principles governing interpretation describe modes of rea-
soning and are thus necessarily much less rule-like than many of the
principles discussed above. It is with respect to this section, therefore,
that readers might be most skeptical of the viability of a codification
effort. The authors would likely agree - the blackletter principles they
provide here are intended merely to provide general guidance. The trea-
tise does so by breaking down the challenge of interpretation into dis-
crete components, which include identifying the holding of a case, sep-
arating holdings from dicta, determining the proper scope of any rule
that can be extracted, and analogizing between the facts of cases.
When it comes to interpretation, one of the treatise's central insights
is that the challenge belongs as much to the authoring court as it does
to future readers. The meaning of a decision turns on what the precise
question before the court was, what governing rule was applied, what
the relevant facts were, and how the rule was applied to those facts to
answer the question. An opinion's future readers must decide those
points for themselves. But an authoring court can facilitate that process
greatly by clarifying the scope and reasoning of its decision. In short,
although future courts get "the last word" on a decision's meaning, what
the authoring court writes is always the "starting point" (p. 73).
Accordingly, the treatise's dissection of the interpretation process
raises the question of how difficulties in interpreting precedent can be
32 The treatise compares SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 3, at 369-90 (arguing
against the use of legislative history), with ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 29-54
(2014) (arguing that Justice Scalia and Professor Garner's position "fail[s] to reflect the reality of the
legislative process," id. at 52).
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avoided at the front end, when the precedent is written. In other words,
what lessons can authoring courts draw from the treatise? We take up
that question in this Part.
Although we focus here on opinion writing solely from the perspec-
tive of providing better precedential guidance to future courts, we rec-
ognize that authoring courts have other objectives, too. For example, a
fundamental purpose of the judicial opinion is to explain the decision to
the parties.33 Opinions may also help educate the broader public about
what courts are doing that is relevant to their lives.34 The characteristics
that make opinions effective in these respects may coincide with those
that make for effective precedent, but the overlap is not complete.3 s We
do not address here how judges should balance the different objectives
they face. We suggest only that the task of writing more effective pre-
cedent merits greater attention, and we propose ways that authoring
courts can do so with the lessons of the treatise in mind.
Turning to those lessons, we consider below the treatise's implica-
tions for three key steps in the opinion-writing process: refining the ques-
tion presented, identifying the governing law, and describing the mate-
rial facts. There is some artificiality to this breakdown, in that
improvements in one dimension may naturally result in improvements
in the others, but dividing up the discussion in this way helps to high-
light effective practices at a more granular level. Our discussion on each
score begins with the treatise's insights from the perspective of inter-
preting precedent and then works backward from there to draw atten-
tion to better drafting practices for authoring courts.
Our focus throughout is on avoiding unintentional lack of clarity. In
other words, how can authoring courts take more care to announce clear
holdings, indicate the intended scope of their decisions, and so on? We
do not suggest that writing effective precedent means tying the hands of
future courts as much as possible. As we discuss in the section that
concludes this Part, there may be good reasons to write narrowly rather
than broadly or to be vague rather than definitive, so as to preserve
flexibility for later courts. We suggest some factors that may be useful
for authoring courts deciding how much to resolve in a given case, but
our primary argument is that courts should make any such choices in-
tentionally after considering the relevant tradeoffs.
33 See RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, OPINION WRITING 22-24 (3 d ed. 2012).
34 See Abner J. Mikva, For Whom Judges Write, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1357, 1365-66 (1988).
35 For example, in seeking to justify a decision to the parties, a court might be inclined to address
all the points raised in the briefs to show that they have been fully considered. But that degree of
detail is likely to make it harder for readers seeking to apply the case as precedent to grasp its "vital
issues." Id. at 1363 (quoting I JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON
LAW § 8a, at 245 (3d ed. 1940)).
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A. Refining the Question Presented
A clearly defined question presented lays the foundation for an ef-
fective precedent. Usually it is easy enough to say at a high level of
generality what a case is about. Did a particular search violate the
Fourth Amendment? Is the contract at issue enforceable? But it is also
usually true that the court could take a variety of paths to resolve the
case, and readers need to know which grounds the court relied on to
understand how to apply the opinion as precedent. By properly refining
the question presented to identify the precise issue on which the case
turns, authoring courts can reduce confusion that later readers would
have otherwise faced in the interpretation process.
From the standpoint of later readers, knowing exactly what question
the authoring court believed it was resolving is the first step to identify-
ing the holding of the case. The treatise defines holdings as "the parts
of a decision that focus on the legal questions actually presented to and
decided by the court" (p. 44). Identifying the holding is critical because
only that aspect of the case constitutes formally binding precedent. Ev-
erything else, including other statements of legal propositions, consti-
tutes dicta and does not bind future courts (p. 44).36
When an opinion defines the question presented more loosely, it be-
comes more difficult for readers to "glean what the appellate court ac-
tually decided and determine which aspects of the appellate court's writ-
ten opinion were necessary to its ultimate decision" (p. 53). Perhaps the
most basic problem occurs when the authoring court never pinpoints the
legal question it is answering. For example, a court that is considering
overlapping constitutional and statutory challenges to a particular ac-
tion might not clearly identify which issue it is analyzing. Likewise, a
court analyzing a claim involving multiple elements or a multi-pronged
framework may not be precise about the step at which it is deciding the
case. Future readers may then have difficulty determining what aspect
of the legal framework or which doctrinal element the case serves as
precedent for.
Insufficient attention to the question presented can also create con-
fusion about the scope of the rule that can be extracted from the case.
In other words, there may be uncertainty about how broadly or nar-
rowly to state the case's holding. How the authoring court itself states
the holding is not dispositive, because the underlying reasoning may
support a broader or narrower rule, and future courts get to determine
for themselves what that reasoning was (p. 89).
To illustrate the scope problem, the treatise gives the example of a
hypothetical case in which the result is that "Sylvester, the testator's cat,
cannot inherit the $io,ooo bequeathed to him" (p. 59). The holding
36 As we discuss in section D, dicta may be treated as authoritative - including to the point of
being effectively binding, even if not formally so - under particular circumstances.
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could be stated at various levels of generality. A rule such as "cats can-
not inherit money under a will" (p. 59) is probably too narrow because
whatever reasons the court would have given "for not allowing cats to
inherit seem as if they should apply to other animals as well" (p. 59). A
better candidate would be that "animals cannot inherit money under a
will" (p. 59) or perhaps that "animals cannot inherit any type of property
under a will" (p. 6o). Conversely, one can imagine even broader rules -
"that animals cannot own property, period," or "that animals have no
rights at all" - which would go too far because they "probably wouldn't
be supported by the court's discussion" (p. 6o).
The point of the example is that, regardless of what the court pur-
ported to hold, the true holding of the case would depend on what rule
the underlying logic supported. Was the reasoning directed at cats or at
all animals? Was it directed at money or at any type of property? Was
it directed at the act of inheritance or at property ownership in general?
The scope of the holding depends on the level of generality at which the
court reasons. It is ultimately up to future courts to make that determi-
nation, but authoring courts can reduce confusion about what they in-
tended to decide by refining the question presented to clarify the level
of generality at which the facts will be analyzed.
Related to the task of assessing scope is the problem of determining
what reasoning in the opinion actually matters for reaching the result.
This, of course, is the challenge of distinguishing the holding from dicta,
and it too can be made harder when the court does not clearly identify
the precise issue being decided. When a court's reasoning is cast at
varying levels of generality and is difficult to decipher, the "true" holding
of the case may be open to legitimate debate. But a more precise state-
ment of the question presented at least helps readers discern what rea-
soning the court itself thought was necessary to its decision, as opposed
to what it considered dicta. And the authoring court's own view of the
holding is the starting point for interpretation, even if it's not determi-
native (p. 73)- 7
Consider the case of Toll v. Moreno, * involving a public university's
policy of charging lower tuition for "in-state" students. The Supreme
Court began its opinion by stating: "The question in this case is whether
the University's in-state policy is invalid under the Supremacy Clause
of the Constitution, insofar as the policy categorically denies in-state
37 At the very least, an interpreting court can have confidence that any reasoning the authoring
court believed was necessary to decide the case will have been the product of considered judgment,
rather than off-the-cuff musings. That is significant because lower courts will often decide to follow
the reasoned statements of higher courts even when those statements may be considered dicta. See
infra notes lo-o6 and accompanying text.
38 458 U.S. 1 (1982).
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status to domiciled nonimmigrant aliens who hold G-4 visas." 3 (G-4
visas are issued to employees of certain international organizations, like
the World Bank, and their immediate family members.) After summa-
rizing cases involving state discrimination on the basis of alienage, the
Court concluded that the cases "stand for the broad principle that 'state
regulation not congressionally sanctioned that discriminates against
aliens lawfully admitted to the country is impermissible if it imposes
additional burdens not contemplated by Congress."'40
To discern whether the university's tuition policy imposed "addi-
tional burdens not contemplated by Congress," the Court next turned to
two pertinent federal laws. First, Congress had made this particular
class of aliens eligible to establish domicile in the United States, yet the
state was denying them a privilege afforded to others domiciled there.4 '
Second, federal law granted G-4 aliens an exemption "from all taxes on
their organizational salaries."42 The Court concluded that "[b]y impos-
ing on those G-4 aliens who are domiciled in Maryland higher tuition
and fees than are imposed on other domiciliaries of the State, the Uni-
versity's policy frustrate[d]" the federal objective of using tax benefits to
encourage the specified international organizations to base substantial
operations in the United States.4 3
In a dissent, then-Justice Rehnquist advanced a narrow reading of
the case's holding by contending that the Court had invalidated the uni-
versity's tuition policy simply on the basis of a conflict between that
policy and the two federal laws, and hence under a traditional preemp-
tion analysis.44 Thus, in his view, the broad suggestion that "any state
law which discriminates against lawfully admitted aliens is void . . . if
Congress did not contemplate such a law" was dictum.45 That reasoning
was unnecessary to the result, he argued, because the Court found a
"conflict with federal law, just as traditional pre-emption cases
instruct. "46
Our interest, setting aside the disagreement over the merits, is in the
holding/dictum distinction. The ambiguity in the Court's opinion arises
from the fact that its analysis at times appeared to apply a broader test
under which any state regulation that discriminates on the basis of alien-
age is invalid if it imposes a "burden not contemplated by Congress,"
but elsewhere appeared to follow a traditional preemption analysis by
relying on a conflict between the university's tuition policy and federal
39 Id. at 3.
40 Id. at 12-13 (quoting De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 358 n.6 (1976)).
41 Id. at 14.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 16.
44 Id. at 32 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). However, because he found the conflict analysis "quite
unconvincing," he dissented. Id.
45 Id. at 28.
46 Id. at 32.
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statutes. The inconsistent lines of analysis make it difficult to discern a
true holding, but a more precisely stated question presented would have
at least clarified the Court's intentions.
The Court's only statement of the question presented was the one
quoted above, asking whether the university's in-state policy violated
the Supremacy Clause. If the Court had instead specified more clearly
that it sought to decide only whether a public university could permis-
sibly charge G-4 aliens a higher amount in tuition, that would have sug-
gested the Court did not view the broader "additional burdens" language
as necessary to its decision (because the Court's narrower application of
traditional preemption principles would have sufficed to answer that
question). Alternatively, if the Court had stated that the question before
it was whether a state may discriminate against lawfully admitted
aliens, that would have suggested the Court understood its application
of the "additional burdens" test to be necessary to the result. Because
the Court left unclear the specific question it was answering, it is not
surprising that later courts and commentators have interpreted the
case's holding differently.47
To sum up the discussion so far, a properly refined question pres-
ented can reduce confusion in several key dimensions of the interpreta-
tion process: identifying the particular legal question that was answered,
understanding the intended scope of the rule that can be extracted from
the case, and distinguishing between holding and dictum. Beyond af-
firmatively identifying the question to be answered, it may also be help-
ful, as the opinion proceeds, for the court to remind the reader about
what is not being decided. Doing so helps not only to simplify the in-
terpretation process for readers, but also to discipline the authoring
court. Ideally, the inconsistent lines of reasoning in a case like Toll would
be spotted at the drafting stage. If the authoring court stays focused on
the precise question it is answering, it will be more attuned to when it
is venturing into dicta and may well decide that any such unnecessary
statements should be excised before they have a chance to confuse
readers.48
47 Some courts and commentators have cited the very language flagged as dictum by Justice
Rehnquist as Toll's holding. See, e.g., LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F3d 405, 424 (5th Cir. 2005); Carlson
v. Reed, 249 F.3d 876, 881 (9th Cir. 2001); Elisha Barron, Recent Development, The Development,
Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act, 48 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 623, 645 (2011);
Erin F. Delaney, Note, In the Shadow of Article I: Applying a Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis
to State Laws Regulating Aliens, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1821, 1832 (2007); see also Developments in the
Law - Immigration Policy and the Rights of Aliens, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1286, 1417 (1983) (quoting
this language as evidence that the Court expanded "the previous bases of preemption'). Others
have treated Toll as a traditional conflict preemption case. See Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer,
945 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1058, io6o (D. Ariz. 2013), rev'd, 757 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2014); Doe v. St.
Louis Cmty. Coll., No. ED 104574, 2017 WL 2950753, at *13 (Mo. Ct. App. July II, 2017).
48 We discuss circumstances in which dicta may be useful in section D below.
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By way of illustration, consider a case in which the court effectively
narrowed the issues to be decided while bracketing others that were
unnecessary to reach, thus leaving readers a clear sense of how the case
could properly be applied as precedent. In United States v. Gonsalves,49
the court was asked to decide whether a warrantless search for drugs in
a doctor's office conducted under a state health administrator's statu-
tory inspection authority was permitted as an administrative search un-
der the Fourth Amendment.5 0 The first objection of the defendant,
Wallace Gonsalves, Jr., was that the actions taken by the administrator,
Catherine Cordy, could not satisfy the threshold step for qualifying as
an administrative search because "the medical profession should not be
treated as a highly regulated enterprise."s' The court rejected this ar-
gument by pointing to the "numerous, longstanding and pervasive" pro-
visions in state law pertaining to the "storage and dispensation" of
drugs.52
In the course of its analysis, the court helpfully underscored the level
of generality at which it was addressing the facts:
Our focus, therefore, is on the regulation of drugs ....
Whether the practice of medicine in general meets this test is a different
question that we need not decide. Nor are we concerned on this appeal
with patient records; Cordy's search and seizure was solely directed to mis-
branded and adulterated drugs held at large in Gonsalves' office. Given
the variations in fact patterns and the sensitivity of the subject area, there
is good reason to keep our focus narrow and, for the time being, to let the
law develop case by case.53
This clarification was valuable because Gonsalves himself had framed
his argument as concerning the "medical profession" in general. A less
careful court might have stated only the general question presented,
leaving it to readers to figure out that its reasoning addressed only the
regulation of drugs. Or if it had included some reasoning that related
to. the medical profession in general, readers would then have faced dif-
ficulties in trying to distinguish dictum from holding. The passage as
written prevents that uncertainty.
As the opinion proceeded, the court continued to identify and set
aside issues that were not being addressed:
The other three conditions for an administrative search are that the
scheme serve a substantial government interest, that administrative (war-
rantless) searches be "necessary," and that the scheme impose alternative
49 435 F.3 d 64 (ist Cir. 2006).
50 Id. at 66-67.
51 Id. at 67.
52 Id.
53 Id. (citations omitted).
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safeguards. The first is obviously satisfied and the second is adequately
covered by case law explaining the need for random and surprise inspec-
tions. Gonsalves does not make a frontal attack on either of these two
conditions.54
These quick statements were helpful for clearing out the questions that
did not require analysis and preventing any confusion about what doc-
trinal element the ensuing discussion would be covering.
As the court turned to the third additional condition for an adminis-
trative search, it again helpfully reformulated the question to be an-
swered to avoid implying a more categorical rule than it intended to
create. Gonsalves had raised two separate but related concerns about
administrative searches involving individualized suspicion: "Gonsalves'
other main attack on Cordy's search and seizure of the vaccines stems
from the fact that this search [i] was not random but grew out of a
specific charge of misconduct and [2] was coordinated as to timing with
the Attorney General's search."55 As to the second concern, the court
explained:
Patently, the Attorney General did not use Cordy as a proxy to conduct
his own warrantless search; the Attorney General secured a warrant and
had probable cause. That Cordy coordinated the timing of her search with
law enforcement authorities, so that neither side tipped off Gonsalves by
acting alone, was not an evasion of the limits on either of them.5 6
Here again the court bracketed questions it was not deciding, this time
underscoring how different facts not present in this case might have
been more troubling. Although there was some coordination between
the Attorney General and Cordy, it was permissible to address the con-
cern that Gonsalves might have been tipped off if they had acted sepa-
rately. Coordination alone was not problematic, but the court was care-
ful not to imply a more blanket ruling. Crucially, by emphasizing that
the record did not reflect an effort to allow the Attorney General to
circumvent the warrant requirement, the court reserved the question
whether coordination of that sort would have been more problematic.
Having dealt with that concern, the court then distilled Gonsalves's
objections to the targeted nature of the search into a single remaining
issue: "The question, then, is whether Cordy should be prevented from
making a warrantless search because in this case it was not random and
because she in fact had good cause to suppose a violation." 5  After con-
sidering some potentially conflicting out-of-circuit precedent, the court
answered that question in the negative.8




58 Id. at 68-69.
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A less careful court might have addressed Gonsalves's multifaceted
argument in a more sweeping manner, neglecting to parse out the ques-
tions that could be reserved because the record in this case did not re-
quire their resolution. But this court, by stating the question to be re-
solved so precisely, made clear that it was holding only that an
administrative search is not rendered unlawful solely because it is tar-
geted as opposed to random. Future courts addressing cases involving
coordination as a means of circumvention, or other potential abuses of
inspection authority, will be free to consider those questions on a clean
slate.
B. Identifying the Governing Law
In addition to homing in on the precise question or questions it seeks
to answer, an authoring court must also consider how best to describe
the governing law that applies to the issues at hand. It would be un-
usual for a court to fail to cite any law. The more likely problem is a
discussion of legal sources and principles that obscures the key point
doing most of the analytical work. Lack of clarity on this dimension,
even with a well-stated question presented, can lead to confusion for
later readers who need to understand the rationale of a decision in order
to extract the proper rule from the case.
As the treatise explains, readers seeking to identify an opinion's hold-
ing are interested in not just the outcome of the case at hand, but also
the ratio decidendi, the Latin phrase that means "reason for deciding"
(p. 46). More specifically, the treatise identifies the following key com-
ponents of the ratio decidendi: "(I) it must be a ruling on a point of law;
(2) it must be expressly or impliedly given by a judge; (3) it must relate
to an issue raised in the litigation; and (4) it must be necessary as a
justification for the decision reached" (p. 46).s9 Although some distin-
guish between the holding and ratio decidendi, the treatise generally
uses the former term to encompass the latter (p. 46), and we will do the
same.
An earlier section of the treatise explains that every opinion can be
read as a syllogism consisting of a major premise, minor premise, and
conclusion (p. 23). The major premise generally states some proposition
of law: "Under specified circumstances, the rights of certain parties are
X and Y" (p. 23). The minor premise makes an assertion about the
present case: "In this particular case, the parties are of the kind contem-
plated by the rule in the major premise and the circumstances are as
specified - all other facts being immaterial" (p. 23). And the conclusion
states what logically follows from the two premises: "The rights of the
parties in this case are X and Y" (p. 23).
59 The treatise cites John Bell, Precedent, in THE NEW OXFORD COMPANION TO LAW 923,
923 (Peter Cane & Joanne Conaghan eds., 2008).
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With this model of syllogistic reasoning in mind, authoring courts
can aid the interpretive process by clearly identifying the major premises
of their underlying syllogisms. There are at least two common ways
that the major premise can be obscured. First, courts sometimes overuse
boilerplate, meaning the general propositions of law that effectively
serve as truisms in a particular context and are reflexively repeated even
when they are far removed from the actual issue in the case.60 Other
commentators have similarly criticized the unnecessary inclusion of boil-
erplate as "counterproductive."6 1 The concern is that opinions can be-
come bloated with various types of "padding,"62 such as the "unembar-
rassed repetition of obvious propositions" or "long quotations from
previous cases to demonstrate fidelity to precedent."6 3  The potential
danger of such "information overload"64 is that it will "make it more
difficult for the writer as well as for the reader to come to grips with the
essential questions."65 In some instances, boilerplate may have the effect
not just of obscuring the major premise, but of masking its absence.66
60 By way of example, consider this passage from a Fourth Amendment case about whether
there was probable cause to support a warrantless search of an automobile:
Pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, an officer may search
a readily mobile vehicle without a warrant if he has probable cause to believe that the
vehicle contains evidence of a crime. We define probable cause as "reasonable grounds
for belief, supported by less than prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion." United
States v. Bennett, 905 F.2d 931, 934 (6th Cir. 1990). Probable cause exists when there is a
"'fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
place."' United States v. Wright, 16 F.3d 1429, 1437 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). Determining whether probable cause existed at the time
of the search is a "'commonsense, practical question' to be judged from the 'totality-of-
the-circumstances."' Id. (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 230). In determining whether prob-
able cause exists, we may not look to events that occurred after the search or to the sub-
jective intent of the officers; instead, we look to the objective facts known to the officers
at the time of the search.
Smith v. Thornburg, 136 F.3 d 1070, 1074-75 (6th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).
61 Mikva, supra note 34, at 1361.
62 Richard A. Posner, Judges' Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?), 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1421,
1441 (1995).
63 Id. at 1430. Judge Posner suggests courts may do this to create an artificial "impression of
great thoroughness," id. at 1441, with the goal of "sweep[ing] the reader along to a confident con-
clusion," id. at 1442.
64 Mikva, supra note 34, at 1363.
65 Posner, supra note 62, at 1446.
66 For an example, again see Smith v. Thornburg, 136 F.3d 1070 (6th Cir. 1998). Immediately
after the boilerplate passage quoted supra in note 6o, the court shifted to its factual application:
We conclude that probable cause existed to search plaintiff's readily mobile vehicle
due to the facts known to the officers at the time. Those facts were as follows: (i) an
unoccupied expensive car was haphazardly parked at 12:40 a.m. in a high crime area; (2)
the engine was running; (3) the headlights were on; (3) [sic] the doors were unlocked; (4)
the radio was turned on; (5) stolen vehicles are frequently abandoned with their engines
running because the ignitions have been tampered with during the theft process; (6) Green
Hills Apartments was known to the officers as a dumping ground for stolen vehicles and
an area from which they had recovered many stolen vehicles; (7) the Dodge Stealth is a
frequently stolen vehicle; and (8) the unlocked and running car was parked only a few feet
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Courts can avoid these concerns by resisting the temptation to include
boilerplate principles and zeroing in on the law that "directly affect[s]
the point at issue."67
A second way opinions can obscure the major premise is by provid-
ing lengthy reasoning without a clear analytical payoff. This can take
different forms depending on the type of reasoning being employed. For
example, when there is relatively little law on point, a court may discuss
first principles68 or policy concerns69 that would follow if one or the
other party prevailed, but never clearly articulate the contours of the
new rule it is fashioning. In other cases, when the resolution of the
from a drug bust and within easy reach of any member of the crowd which gathered.
Under these circumstances, the officers had probable cause to believe the Stealth may
have been a stolen vehicle and, thus, enter the vehicle to determine whether it had been
tampered with or to determine the identity of the owner.
Id. at 1075. When addressing fact-intensive issues like probable cause, more granular rules may
not be possible. Nonetheless, shifting so abruptly from generic, high-level principles to the facts
and then a conclusion makes it difficult for readers to extract any precedential guidance from a
case.
67 Mikva, supra note 34, at 1361 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 7tvo Types ofJudi-
cial Opinion, 6o ALBANY L.J. 76, 77 (1899), reprinted in APPELLATE JUDICIAL OPINIONS 200
(Robert A. Leflar ed., 1974)). The treatise highlights a different problem with boilerplate principles
that is perhaps even more troubling, though less directly relevant to our point. When boilerplate is
not merely cited but actually relied upon, and is divorced from the context in which the principle
at issue was developed, there may be unintended and problematic transformations of the original
idea over time (pp. 92-93). As the treatise explains, "[s]ome of the greatest errors of thinking have
arisen from the mechanical, unreflective application of old formulations . . . to new situations that
are sufficiently discrepant from the old so that the emphasis on likeness is misleading and the ne-
glect of differences leads to unfortunate or foolish consequences" (p. 93) (second alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 276 (1949)).
68 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), is a famous example of this type. In that case,
the Court recognized an unenumerated privacy right based on the "penumbras" of "specific guar-
antees in the Bill of Rights." Id. at 484. The Court concluded that a state contraceptive prohibition
impermissibly intruded upon the "zone of privacy" in a "marriage relationship," but it gave little
guidance as to how this right should be analyzed in future cases. Id. at 485-86; see also David B.
Cruz, "The Sexual Freedom Cases"? Contraception, Abortion, Abstinence, and the Constitution, 35
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 299, 328-53 (2000) (describing five distinct interpretations of Griswold).
69 For example, in International Union, United Mine Workers of America n. Bagwell, 512 U.S.
821 (1994), the Court decided that coercive civil contempt sanctions should sometimes require the
protections of criminal proceedings. Id. at 833-34. It identified specific reasons for treating the
particular sanctions at issue in that case as criminal in nature: The fifty-two-million-dollar million
fine was particularly serious, and the sanction, once imposed, could not be "purge[d]," in contrast
to a traditional coercive civil contempt that the contemnor could negate by performing a simple,
affirmative act. Id. at 837. Moreover, the underlying injunction was especially complex and thus
"require[d] elaborate and reliable factfinding" to properly adjudicate. Id. at 833-34. But the Court,
having decided that criminal proceedings were necessary, did not distill its concerns into an opera-
tional rule to provide guidance on when the civil/criminal line is crossed in contempt sanctions
cases. As a result, later courts drew inconsistent lessons from the decision. At least some decided
that criminal proceedings are needed based solely on the severity of the sanction, while others con-
cluded that criminal proceedings are not needed so long as there is at least an initial opportunity to
purge the contempt. See Margit Livingston, Disobedience and Contempt, 75 WASH. L. REV. 345,
393, 396-99 (2000).
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dispute turns primarily on the interpretation of precedent, the court af-
ter summarizing applicable authority may simply announce without fur-
ther explanation that the earlier decisions compel a particular outcome.
Readers are then left to infer for themselves what the major premise
buried in those case summaries is supposed to be.
The Second Circuit's decision in Tom Doherty Associates v. Saban
Entertainment, Inc.7 0 illustrates how confusion of the latter sort can be
avoided. There the court considered whether a publisher could satisfy
the irreparable harm requirement to obtain injunctive relief after the
defendant ook its valuable book properties to other publishing houses.II
The court summarized several cases, analogous because they involved
the threatened inability to sell a particular product, that reached
opposite conclusions on irreparable harm.7 2 The court then offered the
following "governing principle" to capture when harm would be
considered irreparable:
Where the availability of a product is essential to the life of the business or
increases business of the plaintiff beyond sales of that product . .. the dam-
ages caused by loss of the product will be far more difficult to quantify than
where sales of one of many products is the sole loss. In such cases, injunc-
tive relief is appropriate.73
The present case involved the loss of a significant opportunity, as op-
posed to existing sales, but the court concluded these were "analytically
the same" because "loss of prospective goodwill" involves the same sort
of unquantifiable harm.74
By articulating the key principle to be distilled from the earlier cases,
the court made it easier to reconstruct the opinion's syllogism. The ma-
jor premise was that the irreparable harm requirement is satisfied when
"the damages caused by loss of the product" would be particularly dif-
ficult to quantify after it takes place. The minor premise was that the
loss of prospective goodwill in the present case involved such unquan-
tifiable harm. (The extension of the preexisting rule to the present facts
involved reasoning by analogy to the minor premises of past cases,
which is the subject of the next section.) Thus, the irreparable harm
requirement was satisfied in this case.
A less helpful decision might have summarized existing precedent
and then simply declared that the present case was more like the ones
in which irreparable harm was deemed satisfied than the ones in which
it was not. Readers would then have to determine for themselves what
the salient features of those earlier cases were and why they were
deemed to be similar in the relevant respects to the facts of Tom Doherty
70 6o F.3d 27 (2d Cir. 1995).
71 Id. at 29-32, 37.
72 Id. at 37.




Associates. In the absence of guidance, readers might extract a holding
different from the one that the authoring court intended. An authoring
court can prevent these difficulties by synthesizing the analytical payoff
of the precedents it has summarized, thereby ensuring that readers begin
with the correct major premise as they work to reconstruct the case's
underlying syllogism.
C. Describing the Material Facts
Once the authoring court has identified the governing law, the chal-
lenge is to apply the law to the facts of the case in a manner that will
provide guidance to future courts deciding similar cases. Of course,
sometimes stating the rule tells you all you need to know.5 A rule
providing a strict ten-day deadline with no exceptions, for example, does
not require illustration in a factual context to grasp. But often merely
knowing what a rule says in the abstract does not resolve a case because
we need the particulars in order to give that rule meaning.6 For exam-
ple, the rule that a lawful congressional delegation of rulemaking au-
thority to an administrative agency must contain an "intelligible princi-
ple" to constrain the agency's decisionmaking does not provide much
guidance without offering some sense of what it means to be intellig-
ible." In such cases, courts examine how precedent has applied the rule
to previous facts and then determine whether the new facts are analo-
gous. Authoring courts can equip future courts to do this by explaining
precisely which facts in the present case trigger the rule at issue, why
they matter, and how they matter relative to each other.
The need to reason by analogy increases to the extent that the gov-
erning law is structured more as a standard than as a firm rule. Con-
sider a run-of-the-mill negligence case in which a defendant who fails to
exercise reasonable care is liable for any resulting harm caused. It's not
feasible to articulate the governing law more precisely in a way that
would apply to all of the conduct constituting a lack of reasonable care
(p. 81). So it is left to authoring courts to fill in the various possible
meanings of that standard across negligence cases by identifying a range
of fact patterns that match. Those decisions, in turn, serve as precedents
to guide the resolution of future disputes that are factually similar.8
7 See CARDOZO, supra note Ig, at 164 ("Of the cases that come before the court in which I sit,
a majority, I think, could not, with semblance of reason, be decided in any way but one. The law
and its application alike are plain.").
76 See id. ("In another and considerable percentage [of cases], the rule of law is certain, and the
application alone doubtful.").
7 See Whitman v. Am. Tucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 463 (2001) (quoting Am. Trucking Ass'ns
v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).
78 Over time, the treatise explains, narrower rules may emerge even if they are not stated ex-
plicitly, as "some generic fact situations may occur so often that they provide a good working sense
of the law" (p. 81).
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Thus, in cases governed by standards stated at a high level of generality,
the parties typically agree on the well-established governing law, and
the dispute turns entirely on which side draws more persuasive analo-
gies to past cases.
Reasoning by analogy is also important when the law is to be ex-
tended or adapted to a different context or new circumstances. Author-
ing courts cannot predict the full field of future cases to which their
reasoning may later be relevant.9 For example, a court could not craft
a rule that takes into account technology that doesn't yet exist, or antic-
ipate how its decision in a securities case might be relevant to antitrust
law. Nor would we want it to try to do so. But when interpreting courts
confront cases in which there is no precedent directly on point, we do
not assume they are free to write on a blank slate (p. 105). Rather, we
expect them to reason by analogy, following the bedrock principle that
"[1]ike cases should be decided alike" (p. 21). Clarity in the authoring
court's factual discussion facilitates that analogical reasoning process.
To put this discussion in the treatise's terms: If the governing law
constitutes the major premise of the syllogism, the application of the law
to the facts of the case is the minor premise by which we can reason
from the major premise to a conclusion. Recall from our discussion of
the governing law above that the major premise of a case provides for
a particular result if "specified circumstances" exist (p. 23). The minor
premise is the court's assertion of whether those circumstances exist in
a particular case (p. 23).
For a more concrete example, consider the following major premise
from the negligence case: A defendant who fails to exercise reasonable
care is liable for any resulting harm caused. A minor premise in the
case might be: The defendant in this particular case failed to exercise
reasonable care because of facts A, B, and C. That is, A, B, and C are
the facts in the case that constitute one of the specified circumstances (a
lack of reasonable care) contemplated by the major premise (p. 97). A
future court can then analogize between that case and a later case by
determining that the facts A, B, and C in the precedent are sufficiently
similar to facts in the later case for the same result to be reached
(Principle #9).so
The challenge for the authoring court, then, is to articulate the minor
premise by explicitly describing which facts matter for the court's ap-
plication of the governing law and, just as important, why. By doing
79 See Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 893-99 (2006).
80 Or a future court could identify a material fact, D, in the precedent that is not present in the
later case. It may then distinguish the precedent by recharacterizing the precedent's minor premise
as: The defendant in that particular case failed to exercise reasonable care because of A, B, C, and
D (Principle #8). As we noted above and will explore further below, later courts have the final say




so, the authoring court is able to refine for future courts what it consid-
ers to be the "specified circumstances" contemplated by the governing
law (p. 23).
The most basic step the authoring court can take on that score is to
clarify which facts fall within the major premise's specified circum-
stances - that is, what A, B, and C are. But an authoring court can
provide greater guidance by also indicating why and how those facts
matter. As an illustration of this point, consider an example from the
personal jurisdiction context.
In McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.," the Supreme Court
applied the recently established "minimum contacts" test to a suit in
which the defendant insurance company's only contact with the forum
state of California was the single policy at issue in the case.8 2 After
citing some general principles and a recent trend toward expanding the
scope of personal jurisdiction, the Court concluded:
[W]e think it apparent that the Due Process Clause did not preclude the
California court from entering a judgment binding on respondent. It is
sufficient for purposes of due process that the suit was based on a contract
which had substantial connection with that State. The contract was deliv-
ered in California, the premiums were mailed from there and the insured
was a resident of that State when he died.8 3
Such a summary in the analysis phase of the opinion at least makes clear
which facts mattered; earlier-recited background facts that were not re-
iterated were presumably not relevant to the analysis. But in simply
restating a string of facts, the Court provided no guidance on whether
all of those facts were needed to reach its conclusion, whether any might
have been independently sufficient, or whether some were more im-
portant than others. Nor did the McGee Court explain why each of the
restated facts was legally significant - how they contributed to creating
a "substantial connection" with California - so that readers could better
understand how to distinguish from or analogize to the case in a future
dispute involving similar but not identical facts. Those questions fell
entirely to later courts to answer.
As it turned out, the Supreme Court itself took up those issues later
that same Term in Hanson v. Denckla.4 There the Court faced a similar
scenario in which the defendants had no contact with the forum state of
Florida except a single contract - in this instance a trust agreement -
355 U.S. 220 (,957)-
82 Id. at 222.
83 Id. at 223 (citations omitted). The Court also went on to address California's "manifest in-
terest in providing effective means of redress for its residents when their insurers refuse to pay
claims." Id. This relates to what would later become the reasonableness prong of personal juris-
diction analysis, and not to minimum contacts. We omit it here to keep the illustration relatively
simple.
84 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
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that was the basis of the dispute.8 5 In examining whether the outcome
was controlled by McGee, the Court characterized the earlier case as
having involved two key facts: the solicitation of a California resident
for the agreement at issue and the mailing of insurance premiums from
that state until the insured had died.86 The Court then explained why
the absence of anything analogous to the first of those two facts made
this case distinguishable from McGee:
[T]his action involves the validity of an agreement hat was entered without
any connection with the forum State. The agreement was executed in
Delaware by a trust company incorporated in that State and a settlor dom-
iciled in Pennsylvania. The first relationship Florida had to the agreement
was years later when the settlor became domiciled there, and the trustee
remitted the trust income to her in that State. From Florida Mrs. Donner
carried on several bits of trust administration that may be compared to the
mailing of premiums in McGee. But the record discloses no instance in
which the trustee performed any acts in Florida that bear the same relation-
ship to the agreement as the solicitation in McGee. Consequently, this suit
cannot be said to be one to enforce an obligation that arose from a privilege
the defendant exercised in Florida.8 7
Because McGee left unclear the relative significance of the facts high-
lighted in its analysis and why they mattered, the Hanson Court had
substantial discretion on these points. The Court decided that the initial
solicitation, as opposed to any ongoing administrative communication,
was the true linchpin.
The Hanson Court then went on to explain why solicitation should
be the key fact in cases of this type:
The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonres-
ident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum
State. The application of that rule will vary with the quality and nature of
the defendant's activity, but it is essential in each case that there be some
act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of con-
ducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws.88
Thus, to help explain why the absence of solicitation was significant,
Hanson created an important distinction between purposeful contact by
the defendant and fortuitous contact based on the unilateral activity of
other actors. This elaborated rationale not only helps future readers
understand how to apply Hanson to factually similar cases involving
contracts, but also facilitates analogical reasoning between Hanson and
other cases involving borderline contacts with the forum.8 9
85 Id. at 251-52.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 252 (footnote omitted).
88 Id. at 253.
89 Over time, the concept of purposeful availment was invoked more broadly and eventually
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None of this discussion about the importance of clarifying the case's
operative facts is meant to suggest that authoring courts should avoid
including additional facts for context. Opinions almost always include
more facts than are needed to resolve the case, and that is not necessarily
a problem. For example, contextual facts help authoring courts recount
cases as stories, and a story is often more compelling to readers because
it makes it easier for them to view the problems in the case from the
perspectives of the litigants.9 0 Difficulties arise only when it becomes
unclear which facts are actually driving the court's reasoning and why
they are significant (pp. 80-81). In most cases, the court will recite facts
initially in a background section and reiterate the ones that really matter
later in the discussion. But when the facts are simply restated without
analysis and followed by a legal conclusion, readers are left to divine on
their own why those facts fall within the specified circumstances con-
templated by the governing law.9'
D. Deciding How Much to Resolve
Our focus in the preceding sections was on clarity: how an authoring
court can reduce confusion about the precise question it's answering,
the rule it's creating or extracting from preexisting authorities, and the
specific facts it's relying on to reason from that rule to an answer to the
question. At each step, though, the authoring court must first make a
choice about how much it wants to resolve and how much it wants to
reserve for future courts.92
In identifying the precise question to be answered, for example, the
court can frame the issue at different levels of generality. In the
Gonsalves case discussed above, the court opted to analyze whether the
drug industry specifically was "highly regulated,"93 but it could have
addressed that issue with respect to the medical profession more
generally.
became its own gloss on the "minimum contacts" test. Thus, in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (5980), the Court determined that a car dealer and distributor were not
subject to personal jurisdiction in Oklahoma, id. at 295, because the car they sold in New York
reached Oklahoma through the unilateral activity of the buyer, id. at 298. The situation there was
very different, but the analogy to Hanson is that the sellers, like the trustee in Hanson, never en-
gaged in purposeful contact with the forum state. Id.
90 See Martha C. Nussbaum, Poets as Judges: Judicial Rhetoric and the Literary Imagination,
62 U. Cm. L. REV. 1477, 1516-17 (1995).
91 For an additional example of the recitation of facts without much analysis, see supra note 66.
92 On the nature of this problem with respect to the levels of generality at which courts charac-
terize constitutional rights, see generally Michael Coenen, Characterizing Constitutional Inputs, 67
DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2018); and Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in
the Definition of Rights, 57 U. Cm. L. REV. 1057 (1990).
93 United States v. Gonsalves, 435 F.3d 64, 67 (ist Cir. 2oo6).
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Likewise, when identifying the governing law, the court has discre-
tion about how strictly or loosely it chooses to articulate the rule it is
creating or extracting from preexisting authorities. In Tom Doherty As-
sociates, the court was able to synthesize a fairly granular rule across
cases for what constituted irreparable harm,94 but in other settings a
court might prefer to identify only a more general principle and to let
future courts refine the rule as it's applied to additional sets of facts.95
Finally, when deciding how much to say about material facts, the
court has discretion about how definitive it wants to be in determining
which facts matter and why.96 In McGee, the Court opted not to say
whether the three key facts establishing minimum contacts with the fo-
rum state were independently sufficient or whether all were necessary
to satisfy due process. Although that choice engendered uncertainty for
readers, an authoring court might sometimes deliberately choose such a
cautious approach to allow future courts to determine which facts in the
case should be considered critical and for what reasons.9 7
As an initial matter, it's worth observing that a court does not pitch
the breadth of its decision on a blank slate. Far from it. The authoring
court may decide only the legal questions actually presented to it (Prin-
ciple #4). The federal courts, for example, are limited by Article III of
the Constitution to resolving actual cases and controversies. 9  Issues
not actually presented by the case are left to future courts to resolve on
another day. In this way, each judicial decision is only one small part
of a much larger process in which the underlying legal problem is refined
and resolved by different courts over time. No authoring court need
think that its job is to solve the problem once and for all.
At the same time, as the examples above indicate, decisions about
the scope of the questions presented and how broadly to describe the
94 Tom Doherty Assocs. v. Saban Entm't, Inc., 6o F.3 d 27, 37-39 (2d Cir. 1995).
95 We previously identified Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), as an example of a
case in which no clear rule was articulated. See supra note 68. Given the relative novelty of the
privacy right at issue, the Court's vague pronouncement in that case may have been prudent.
96 Resolving less at this step might often look the same as a lack of clarity. In other words, a
court that chooses not to say exactly which facts matter is also providing less guidance to future
readers seeking to analogize to or distinguish from the case. To minimize confusion, authoring
courts should be explicit about their choice to leave a question open: If a court is not prepared to
say whether two key facts are both necessary to the outcome of the case, it should simply say so.
See, e.g., Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2346 (2014) ("Although the threat of
Commission proceedings is a substantial one, we need not decide whether that threat standing alone
gives rise to an Article III injury. The burdensome Commission proceedings here are backed by
the additional threat of criminal prosecution. We conclude that the combination of those two threats
suffices to create an Article III injury under the circumstances of this case." (emphasis added)).
97 Justice Black, the author of the majority opinion in McGee, see McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co.,
355 U.S. 220, 221 (1957), dissented in Hanson, which suggests that he might have chosen to provide
greater guidance in McGee if he had anticipated how it would later be interpreted, see Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 256-58 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting).
98 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, Cl. I.
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rules and facts in answering them are inescapable in writing opinions.
If authoring courts simply wrote every opinion as narrowly as possible,
each opinion would be limited to its precise facts and thus offer very
little precedential guidance to future litigants and courts (p. 59).9"
In considering whether to resolve more or less in a given case, au-
thoring courts may find it helpful to think about their role in the larger
collective project we highlighted earlier.0 0 That perspective leads to
approaching questions of scope by asking what would be most useful to
later courts (and the litigants before them) in the process of developing
the law. If an authoring court lacks confidence that it has clear guidance
to offer future courts, writing more narrowly will avoid leading future
courts astray while preserving flexibility for them.0 1 Indeed, because a
court often cannot foresee how a broader ruling will impact the full field
of future cases to which the rule will apply,10 2 there is much virtue in
restraint. But at times there may be good reason to depart from a strict
minimalist approach when an authoring court can provide clear guid-
ance to future courts on a legal issue that has been litigated by the par-
ties and fully considered by the court. However an authoring court re-
solves this question in a given case, the court should be intentional about
its decision and recognize what is at stake in the tradeoff.
At first glance, one might object that it doesn't really matter how the
authoring court frames its decision because "the later court always gets
the last word" (p. 73). True, as we emphasized earlier,0 3 the authoring
court's words will serve as the starting point. But later courts will ulti-
mately decide for themselves how to interpret and apply a precedent. A
later court may determine, for example, that certain propositions in an
opinion were dicta and therefore not binding, or that a broadly stated
principle should be read in light of the narrow factual context actually
before the court (which means, in effect, that any broader implications
are treated as dicta) (pp. IO2-O3).104
99 As others have observed, the articulation of general rules also promotes the rule of law by
showing that courts are deciding cases based on neutral principles rather than on an ad hoc basis.
See Scalia, supra note 14, at 1177-79; Waldron, supra note 5, at 20 ("This, I believe, is a primary
obligation that [a judge] has under the rule of law - to derive her particular decisions from an
identified and articulated general norm.").
100 See supra p. 549.
101 See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME (1999). Incremental decisionmak-
ing also captures accumulated input from a broader set of judges with different backgrounds and
experiences, which often results in better decisions. See id. at 3-23.
102 See Schauer, supra note 79, at 893-99.
103 See supra p. 557.
104 For example, the Supreme Court recently invalidated the Stolen Valor Act of 2005, 18 U.S.C.
§ 704 (2006), which prohibits the making of false statements about military honors. See United
States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 715 (2012). Although earlier cases had broadly suggested that false
statements were not entitled to First Amendment protection, those cases all involved "defamation,
fraud, or some other legally cognizable harm associated with a false statement, such as an invasion
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But even while emphasizing the second court's final say in the pro-
cess, the treatise makes clear that broad statements and dicta have a
significant role to play in developing the law. That is particularly true
of judicial dicta - meaning statements that were not strictly necessary
to the result but were the product of apparent consideration0 5 - as
opposed to obiter dicta, which are "peripheral, off-the-cuff judicial re-
mark[s]" (p. 62). Lower courts generally treat the judicial dicta of higher
courts as entitled to substantial weight, up to and including treating
them as effectively binding (pp. 69-70). Some circuit courts do the same
for judicial dicta in their own decisions (pp. 63-64), and even those
courts that don't would likely afford such statements persuasive value
(pp. 64-65). Thus, when an authoring court resolves more than it needs
to, the impact on future courts might be good (useful guidance) or bad
(confusion or rigidity), but the choice is not without consequence.106
More concretely, there are several factors that a court might consider
in choosing whether to resolve more or less in a given case. Our focus
is on factors that relate to the courts' shared project of developing the
law, in which future courts and the litigants before them might benefit
from either greater guidance or greater flexibility depending on the
circumstances. 07
of privacy or the costs of vexatious litigation." Id. at 7 19. None of the cases "confronted a measure,
like the Stolen Valor Act, that targets falsity and nothing more." Id. Thus, the Court interpreted
the earlier statements within their factual contexts and treated their more categorical implications
as dicta (pp- 56-5 7).
105 The treatise defines judicial dictum as "an opinion by a court on a question that is directly
involved, briefed, and argued by counsel, and even passed on by the court, but that is not essential
to the decision and therefore not binding even if it may later be accorded some weight" (p. 62)
(quoting Dictum, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 20).
106 The treatise suggests that obiter dicta are "seldom considered precedential," though they are
"sometimes persuasive" (p. 62). But even obiter dicta of a higher court may be difficult to ignore in
practice, since the line between obiter and judicial dicta is no less vexing than the line between
holding and dictum. For example, the Supreme Court's suggestions.prior to Alvarez that false
statements are categorically not entitled to constitutional protection arguiably fell closer to the obiter
dicta side of the spectrum, given that the Court probably did not fully consider the value of false
speech as a distinct category when it addressed the more specific issues of defamation, fraud, and
the like. See supra note 104. But that did not stop lower court judges and litigants from taking
those suggestions seriously (pp. 56-57). See United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1219 (9th Cir.
2010) (Bybee, J., dissenting) (noting the "clarity and consistency of the Supreme Court's insistence
that false statements of fact . . . generally fall outside First Amendment protection"), aff'd, 567 U.S.
709 (2012). Given the potential for sowing confusion and unwittingly tying the hands of future
courts, authoring courts should identify the dicta in their own decisions at the drafting stage and
give careful consideration to whether they should be included. See supra text accompanying note
4S.
107 Of course, other factors affect the breadth of a court's decision. In particular, precedential
decisions are usually issued by multimember courts, which means that the realities of disagreement
and the need for compromise can affect the breadth of a decision. For example, members of a panel
might think different facts matter to the outcome and compromise by drafting an opinion that
includes all of them. Or a panel might describe a legal standard at a high level of generality only
because the judges can't agree on what that standard would require more concretely.
CRAFTING PRECEDENT
A primary consideration is where the authoring court sits within the
judicial hierarchy. Higher courts are called upon to provide greater
guidance than lower courts. Appellate courts expending resources on a
precedential opinion seek to provide guidance to a greater number of
litigants and lower courts in order to justify the use of limited judicial
resources in deciding those cases.108 That consideration is especially
true with respect to the U.S. Supreme Court and state supreme courts
with discretionary jurisdiction, given that they generally take cases for
the express purpose of clarifying the law. Against the preference to pro-
vide as much guidance as possible, however, a higher court must weigh
the benefits of restraint, such as letting the legal issue percolate in the
lower courts, where litigants and judges may further refine the issue and
test competing approaches to resolving it.
This tradeoff was openly debated by the Supreme Court last Term
in Maslenjak v. United States.0 9 At issue in the case was a federal
statute that makes it a crime to knowingly procure naturalization
through unlawful conduct.11 0 The immediate question before the Court
was whether the unlawful conduct (in this case, lying in a naturalization
application) must have contributed to the government's decision to
grant naturalization in order for criminal liability to attach."' The
Court held that it must.112 Because the district court in the petitioner's
criminal case had instructed the jury otherwise, the opinion could have
ended there."13 But what the Court described as an "operational" ques-
tion remained: How should the causal influence requirement apply in
practice?114
The majority decided it was worth providing "further guidance" to
future prosecutors, defendants, and district courts because it determined
that it was "well-positioned" to do so."15 The parties had fully briefed
what causal standard should apply, and the issue had already percolated
in (and befuddled) the lower courts, one of which called the "Court's
failure to provide clear guidance 'maddening[]."' 6 The Court therefore
went on to hold that the causal standard was an objective one (would
108 In many oral arguments before appellate courts, advocates will resist responding to a hypo-
thetical because (as the judges well know) "that is not this case." But the appellate court often is
not interested in simply declaring a winner based on the particular facts of the present case. The
purpose of the hypothetical is to help the court fashion a more generally applicable rule. For a
recent exchange along these lines, see 'Transcript of Oral Argument at 4-II, Hernandez v. Mesa,
137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017) (No. 15-118).
109 137 S. Ct. 1918 (2017).
110 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a) (2012).
Ill Maslenjak, 137 S. Ct. at 1923-24.
112 Id. at 1924.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 1927.
115 Id. at 1927 n-4.
116 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Latchin, 554 F 3 d 709, 713 (7th Cir. 2009)).
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the lie have affected how a "reasonable government official" applied the
naturalization law?" 7 ), and that lies about facts that would disqualify
the applicant from naturalization or "throw investigators off a trail lead-
ing to disqualifying facts" would satisfy the standard.1 8
However, Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Thomas, wrote sepa-
rately to say that he would have stopped after resolving the immediate
question whether or not a causal requirement applied."9 In their view,
it would have been better to let the operational question percolate longer
in the lower courts, where the issue's resolution could benefit from "the
crucible of adversarial testing" and "the experience of our thoughtful
colleagues on the district and circuit benches."12 0
A second consideration is the state of the law at the time of the au-
thoring court's decision. For example, the existing caselaw around an
issue may be extensive yet disconnected or not rationalized, such that
there are various piecemeal rules, but no general rule. The authoring
court might decide that the time has come to synthesize across the cases
to offer greater guidance with a more general rule. A well-known ex-
ample of such synthesis is MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,12 a New
York products liability case in which Buick negligently manufactured a
car that injured the plaintiff when one of its wooden wheels suddenly
"crumbled into fragments."122 Before MacPherson, New York common
law required a plaintiff to be in contractual privity with the manufac-
turer to recover in such suits, but that requirement was not met in
MacPherson because the plaintiff had purchased the car from a dealer,
not the manufacturer.123 However, the privity requirement did not ap-
ply with respect to "inherently dangerous" products, and over time
courts had separately declared that scaffolding, a building, an elevator,
a rope, bottles of aerated water, and even a coffee urn were inherently
dangerous.124 In MacPherson, Judge Benjamin Cardozo recognized
that the lower courts had essentially gravitated to a new rule altogether,
which he announced in the court's decision: There was no privity re-
quirement; a manufacturer could be held liable for anyone foreseeably
hurt by its negligence.125
117 Id. at 1928.
118 Id. at 1929.
119 Id. at 1931 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
120 Id.
121 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 19r6).
122 Id. at IO I.
123 Id.
124 DAVm A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 80-82 (2010); see also MacPherson, iiI
N.E. at 1052.
125 MacPherson, iii N.E. at 1o52; STRAUSS, supra note 124, at 80-85.
578 [Vol. 131:543
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Conversely, when there is little or no caselaw in an area, a court
might decide to write narrowly (or loosely) to permit later courts to de-
velop the contours of the law more gradually after different theories are
developed and tested in future cases.126 After all, before the time was
ripe for Judge Cardozo to synthesize across products liability cases and
hold that there was no privity requirement, courts first issued incremen-
tal decisions that explored and pushed the boundaries of the "inherently
dangerous" exception, thereby gradually eroding the privity require-
ment. Those decisions issued narrow holdings that applied only to the
products at issue in the cases, such as a scaffold of a certain heightl2 7 or
a coffee urn that was steam driven.12 8
Finally, the authoring court might consider the state of its knowledge
about present and future factual circumstances to which its ruling might
apply. For example, in a case dealing with nascent technology, the au-
thoring court might be reluctant to speak broadly when it is still unclear
what that technology's (or its next generation's) capabilities will ulti-
mately be, how widely it will be adopted, and so on. In United States
v. Knotts,129 the Supreme Court held that the use of a beeper to track a
criminal suspect's car wasn't a "search" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment because the suspect lacked a reasonable expectation
of privacy in his car's movement on public streets.13 0  But the Court
carefully reserved judgment on whether the result would change if the
surveillance had occurred twenty-four hours a day in a "dragnet" fash-
ion, rather than in a more limited manner.'13 As a result, the Court
believed that it was not constrained by Knotts when it later confronted
a case involving more intrusive GPS surveillance of a suspect's car,
which it held to be a search.132
As the above considerations and examples show, there will rarely be
a single, obviously correct answer as to how narrowly or broadly an
authoring court should pitch its opinion in a given case. Saying more
might be helpful if doing so will provide clearer guidance to future
courts; saying less might be appropriate because it preserves flexibility
for future courts without running the risk of leading them astray. The
most we can ask of authoring courts is that they make the choice delib-
erately, aware of its impact on future courts and on the overall process
of developing the law through precedent.
126 Alternatively, in some circumstances the absence of controlling law may in fact spur a court
to create a broader framework to provide needed guidance. See, e.g., Shrestha v. Holder, 590 E 3 d
1034, 1039-45 (9th Cir. 2010) (engaging in detailed analysis of how the REAL ID Act guides review
of adverse credibility determinations "[i]n light of the sparsity of Ninth Circuit precedent construing
the REAL ID Act in this context," id. at 1040).
127 Devlin v. Smith, 89 N.Y. 470, 478 (N.Y. 1882).
128 Statler v. George A. Ray Mfg. Co., 88 N.E. 1o63, 1o64 (N.Y. igog).
129 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
130 Id. at 281-82.
131 Id. at 283-84.
132 See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 408-og (2012).
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CONCLUSION
The Law of Judicial Precedent is the most comprehensive and au-
thoritative text to date on the application and authority of judicial prec-
edent in American courts. We hope we've illuminated how the treatise
might be useful for its intended audience of practicing lawyers and
judges. Most immediately, the treatise is an invaluable resource for
identifying the principles that govern which precedents apply in which
courts and what weight those precedents merit. The treatise also puts
the challenge of interpreting precedent into sharp relief - a challenge
that belongs as much to the authors of judicial decisions as to their read-
ers. With that in mind, authoring courts can craft more effective prec-
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